According to preferentialism, welfare consists in having one's preferences satisfied. We ought to ask what requirements these preferences should satisfy. For instance, is it important that they are rational and informed? Other theories deny that welfare is what quality of life is about. In these theories other considerations than faring well may be more important for an individual - such as making a contribution to science or philosophy. Preferences and the satisfaction of preferences seem important in any theory of quality of life. No such theory claims that an individual's preferences and wishes have no importance whatsoever for the quality of his or her life. Therefore, the main questions in this project seem to have general relevance for the subject field: (1) How are we to understand the full-information account of preference rationality? For instance, should it be related to an individual's epistemic circumstances? (2) Is the full-information account a reasonable demand? For instance, can we ignore actual and irrational preferences and satisfy hypothetical and rational preferences instead?