Relativism in legal thinking
This project aims to analyze critically relativistic arguments in legal scholarship (or "legal science"), that is, arguments that assume that something (a statement, a moral judgment, etc.) (1) is correct only in relation to a certain starting-point and (2) that no such starting-point is better or more correct than any other. Examples to be discussed will be drawn from the fields of criminal law, international law, and jurisprudence (the philosophy of law), especially the part of jurisprudence that treats legal reasoning. The central question is if and in what areas relativistic arguments are valid. Such an analysis will be of interest not only because relativistic arguments are often problematic but also because it may contribute to the international debate about the objectivity of law - for it seems that relativism and objectivity cannot easily be combined. This analysis is likely to yield new and interesting knowledge, especially since the subject matter in question has not been treated in a systematic fashion in Swedish or in international legal scholarship. The project is estimated to require two years` full-time work by one person, and to result in four penetrating articles in English and one survey article in Swedish.
Digital scientific report in English is missing. Please contact rj@rj.se for information.