Martin Hall, Lund University 

"The topic of the book is the historical sociology of the concept of 'the West'. The main argument of the book is that 'the West' is a condition of possibility for certain kinds of knowledge in IR and other fields. A weaker version of this argument would be that 'the West' is formative of IR knowledge. I further argue that 'the West' is a lynch-pin in a complex network of concepts that extends over various social scientific and humanistic fields. 

The book contributes too, and is anchored in, an established tradition within IR - historical sociology. At the same time, it challenges this tradition to include the historical sociology of knowledge in IR in its repertoire. 

The book brings new debates and theories to IR:
o Narrative construction of reality
o Relationalism/processualism
o Historical sociology of science/knowledge

The book critically reviews:
o Recent work on civilizational analysis and the West
o Historical sociology in International Relations
o Dimensions of commonality between International Relations and a range of other fields (anthropology, philosophy of history)

The book includes case studies that examines the historical sociology of 'the West' as a contested lynch-pin in different conceptual networks:
o International Relations, anthropology, philosophic history
o The Western Canon, International Relations
o Global history, European miracle/ rise of the West, International Relations

Rationale 

o Growing body of work on West/civilization - contribute to debate/review debate
o Growing body of work on historical sociology in IR - almost only materialistic work
o Growing interest for the history of ideas in IR - not enough specialized studies; restricted to textbooks

Chapters

Introduction: Civilizations, the West, and IR theory
1. Traditions: IR, Historical Sociology, and Ideas
2. Theory: IR and the narrative construction of reality
3. Method: Relational historical sociology of concept formation
4. Case I: Anthropology, philosophic history, and IR (historical sociology of knowledge). Where the West?
5. Case II: Global history, the European Miracle, and IR (meta narratives and all that). When the West?
6. Case III: Arts and IR - the Western Canon (representation, narrative). What the West?
7. Conclusions: Who made/discovered the West?"

Introduction: Civilizations, the West, and International Relations Theory
In this book I will argue that the concept of 'the West' is node in a conceptual framework that constitutes, allows, authorizes, and forms International Relations (IR) knowledge. That is, without 'the West' IR scholars would have had an otherwise composed knowledge - or more correctly knowledges - about their subject matters. Paraphrasing sociologist Margaret Somers (XXXX) the question this book seeks to provide an answer to is why, how, and to what effect do IR scholars have the particular idea that the social world contains something called the West? 

I will not suggest that all IR knowledge explicitly and directly depends on the prior existence of the concept of 'the West'. My emphasis is on the conceptual network of which 'the West' is one node; it is the conceptual network that is a condition of possibility for IR knowledge, not necessarily 'the West' as such and in and of itself.

Thus stated, the purpose of this book cannot be to make a contribution to the knowledge about international relations. Instead, the study aspires to be a contribution to knowledge about IR knowledge. The rationale for this seemingly self-important ambition is to stake out, within IR, a space for self-reflection and sympathetic questioning. There are plenty of locations within IR where dissent and disagreement can be expressed; my study aims to be neither confrontational nor to set up an alternative IR knowledge. I want to know why we know what we know about international relations, and I hypothesize that 'the West' has something to do with the answer. If I am correct, I will in a small way have raised the level of self-awareness of IR as a site of knowledge production. That there is a need, or at least some use, for this self-reflective space, I hope to show through by the example of this book. And that is as far as my ambition extends. 

This study rests on several premises and falls within a particular approach to the study of knowledge, all of which will be developed and defended further in the chapters that follow. Let me here just indicate some of my more important points of departure. 

First, the statement that all abstract - as opposed to practical -knowledge is contained in concepts I take to be axiomatic. For there to be something called knowledge, this something must be conceptualized, whatever the ontological or epistemological status of this knowledge may be. More importantly, because more debateable, I will argue that concepts cannot stand on their own. That is, concepts, as bearers of knowledge, have no meaning in isolation. 'The West' in and of itself, has no meaning. Concepts are always parts of relational conceptual networks and derive their meaning from their respective position in these networks. That conceptual networks are relational means that their constituent concepts have no essences and no a priori meanings. To say 'concept X stands for phenomenon Y' can never mean more than 'this network of relations has temporally and contingently stabilized in configuration Q´. 

Second, and consequently, relational conceptual networks and hence knowledge, are historically and culturally situated. Relational conceptual networks are products of particular historical and geographical specifications, and can and must therefore be studied as any other historical or cultural artefact. The number of differences between, for instance, art and relational conceptual networks are plentiful, but their shared historicity is not one of them. 
Still, thirdly, I am not in this book concerned with the historicity of 'the West' and the conceptual network it is part of, for its own sake. Had that been my main interest, I would have written a much more detailed study over a clearly and narrowly delimited time period and cultural sphere. Instead, in the words of Jens Bartelson, and echoing those of Foucault, I am not concerned with telling "what actually happened in the past, but to describe how the present [state of IR knowledge] became logically possible" (Bartelson 1995: 8). There are several means to reach this end. I have chosen to deploy a historical sociology of concept formation (Somers 1995a, 1995b). The main features - relationality and historicity of concepts - of this approach have already been indicated. But why is it important - and it is - that the approach I have chosen is also historical sociological? The reason is that historical sociology is uniquely positioned to dispel the "illusions of false necessity" (Calhoun 2003: 384). In much first and foremost an attack on modernization theory and its attached progressive universalism, historical sociology at its best is tailor-made to show that things could have been otherwise; that things are the way they are for a reason (often power), and that this reason must be theorized. 

Calling my study historical sociological I must immediately explain what it is not. Often historical sociology is portrayed as a sub-discipline to sociology, but explained as a political economic reaction against the "cultural interpretation and sociopsychological accounts" of sociology (Calhoun 1996: 308). However, since the early phases discussed by Calhoun "cultural interpretation and sociopsychological accounts" are no longer anathema to historical sociology (see for instance contributions by XXX in Delanty and Isin (eds) 2003 and XXX in Adams, Clemens, and Orloff (eds) 2005). My study is neither political economic nor traditionally sociological. A traditional sociological approach to my subject matter would probably have asked important and interesting questions about academic gate keeping, career and publishing strategies, and about the politics of universities and scholarly associations, for instance (see Waever Holsti, ngn feminist). A political economic approach to my subject matter would probably have asked important and interesting questions about funding, institution building, academic freedom from the powers that be, and so on (anybody to cite?). My study does not ask these questions, although they might well be crucial to my ambition of understand why, how, and to what effect we have the IR knowledge that we have. This is perhaps the most important theoretical and methodological limitation to my study. 

Rather than pursuing the sociological or political economic affinities of historical sociology I have chosen to look towards what I understand to be a connection to anthropology. Emphasising meaning, and the role of relational networks, as well as the historicity and specificity of knowledge it is difficult not to think of (selected anthropologists) rather than (selected soc pol econ). All these points of departure will be further elaborated in the chapters that follow. Let me now, first, give a preview of my substantial argument, and then, give an outline of how to book will proceed. 

Preview of the argument: IR, civilizations, and 'the West'
There are numerous fine studies on 'the West' in IR (e.g. Coker 1998, Jackson XXXX, O'Hagan 2002), anthropology (e.g. Trouillot 2003), history and geography (e.g. Bonnett 2004, Lewis and Wigen 1997), and literary studies (e.g. Gogwilt 1995), to name just a few sites of knowledge production. If the recent upsurge in civilizational analysis is added on to this literature, the dimensions become absolutely vast. Clearly, I seek to contribute to this literature. In view of the vastness of the literature it seems appropriate to be explicit about what sort of contribution I hope to make. In other words, how can another study on 'the West' be justified? Stephen Prickett has pointed out that 

Experience has shown us that it is preferable to throw a large number of solutions at a given problem in the hope that one or more might succeed, and not to start from a priori first principles (2002: 10).

As an abstract statement, most IR scholars would probably agree with this. My main argument - and therefore also rationale - is that 'the West' is an a priori first principle. Obviously, the IR community is throwing a large number of neo-realist, neo-liberal, feminist, historical sociological, postmodern, post-colonial, and so on, solutions on the IR problem. But, I will ask in this study, is it not that 'the West' has been present as a selective or formative principle before this range of solutions has been formed? Thus, my study differs from many other studies on 'the West' in its focus on the role of 'the West' in the historical sociology of IR knowledge. And herein lies also the rationale for another study on 'the West'. For, I will try to show, many of the other studies that I have alluded to are not studies on 'the West' at all, but are instead studies on the West. And that is a very different undertaking. 

This study is, empirically, more of analytical synthesis than original research. If I can claim any originality, this lies in theory, mentod, and the conclusions I draw.

Outline of the study
The next chapter will provide an overview of the development and current position of historical sociology within IR. I will make several positive and negative arguments. On the positive side, I will suggest that historical sociology of international relations (Hobden and Hobson 2002) is a major advancement of IR knowledge. Specifically, historical sociology has brought with it a greater appreciation of the particularity of modern international relations and the mutability of international relations in general. On the negative side, I will propose that historical sociologists in IR are far from fully developing the potentials of the historical sociological project - that of XXX. It is not so much that what historical sociologists in IR have done is erroneous; instead, they have left much work undone and, second, paid too little attention to what Adams, Clemens, and Orloff (2005) calls the third wave of historical sociology. In the next chapter I chart some of the undone work, and argue that historical sociologist in IR would benefit from surfing the third wave of historical sociology, instead of, or in addition to, the second. The first chapter, then, is a supportive critique of historical sociology in IR.

In the second chapter I will develop my mode of analysis. I shall explain in detail what I mean with relational conceptual networks, and why I - as a student of political science - turn to an affinity between historical sociology and anthropology for theoretical and methodological inspiration. I will also explain how and why my approach is both different and similar from a variety of approaches that could have been employed instead - Foucauldian genealogy, Skinner-ian or Koselleck-ian conceptual history, or post-structural discourse analysis, for instance. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are where I put my approach to use.

In chapter 3 I will study 'the West' as it is situated at an intersection of IR, anthropology, and speculative philosophy of history. The focus of the chapter is on how 'the West' has made these academic disciplines possible both in their general and particular features. I argue that anthropology, IR, and speculative philosophy of history cannot do without 'the West'. This is not a functionalist argument - 'the West' does not exist because IR, speculative philosophy of history, and anthropology needs it. Instead, these disciplines could develop precisely because the concept of the West was formed - it became a node to which other concepts could be connected and given meaning. IR, speculative philosophy of history, and anthropology have since been involved in reproducing the concept of the West as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for knowledge production in their respective fields.

In chapter 4 I focus on to what the effect scholars have had the idea that the social world contains something called the West. I will investigate the role of 'the West' in the debate between Eurocentrism and anti-Eurocentrism - concurring with John Hobson that it is here, rather than in the debate between Marxism, liberalism, and Weberianism that the "real intellectual action lies" (Hobson 2005: 3) - in world history and, more particularly, in works dealing with the so called European Miracle (Jones 1987). I will also show the relevance of this debate for IR.

In chapter 5 the third part of my question is addressed. Here, I seek an answer to why scholars have had the idea that the social world contains something called the West. I acknowledge from the outset that my answer can, at best, be only a limited section of the whole story. The argument of the chapter stands in the shadow of Hayden White's Metahistory (1973). Put simply, I will suggest that the literary and artistic canon - since they are bearers of civilization-defining myths - of any civilization provides the ways in which social processes can be endowed with meaning, and that 'the West' of the literary and artistic canon of the West both informs and authorizes the IR employment of 'the West'. Moreover, I find the post-structuralist argument that representations of the social are part of the social persuasive, and will suggest that part of what IR takes to be its subject is indeed representations. 
The final chapter summarizes my findings and arguments."