Many fundamental moral problems concern whether there are any absolute moral constraints on our actions and whether we are morally allowed to favour ourselves, and our family and friends, for example: 'Is it wrong to kill an innocent human being even if it would mean that many innocent people are saved?' and 'Is it permissible for us in the rich part of the world to spend money on amusements when people in other parts of the world are starving?' Questions like these have made moral philosophers ponder whether morality is agent-relative. According to this view, what is right and wrong for a person to do depends on facts about the person herself. According to the opposite view, morality is agent-neutral. Renowned moral philosophers believe the question whether morality is agent-relative is the central issue of ethical theory. The term 'agent-relative' has however been used in more than one sense. This project attempts to clarify these different senses and relations between them, and to determine whether there is any sense in which it is reasonable to maintain that morality is agent-relative. The assumption is that an investigation will reveal that there are important connections between problems in moral philosophy and agent-relativity that have not received the attention they deserve. For example, the normative view that morality in agent-relative is intimately connected to the meta-ethical view that what a person has reason to do is grounded in what she desires to do.