Pär Sundström, Umeå University

The purpose of the project

The original purpose of the project was to assess the plausibility of Limited Concept Empiricism, the view that there are concepts of sensory qualities that one can acquire only through experience. The main working hypothesis was that the reasons for believing one version or other of Limited Concept Empiricism are considerably weaker than is often supposed.

The purpose of the project has stayed largely intact, and the planned output has been largely realised, even if the project has included some developments not foreshadowed in the original research plan (see section 3 below). A slight alteration in the direction of the project concerns the main working hypothesis. While it still seems to me correct that some grounds for believing Limited Concept Empiricism are weaker than is often supposed, I have come to think that some versions of concept empiricism are on stronger ground than is often supposed, and that this is as interesting (see sections 2 and 3 below).

The project's three most important results

It is not always easy to declare "results" in philosophy (or other research for that matter). But with this reservation, I settle on the following.

(a) In the paper "On imagism about phenomenal thought" I argue that there is no good reason to accept the "imagistic" view that there is some concept, *Q*, for some sensory quality, Q, such that one can employ *Q* only while one experiences Q. This is, I think, a surprising result. For example, it entails that whatever one can think about some specific shade of colour while one experiences that shade one can also think when one doesn't experience it. (Or at least, there is no good reason to suppose otherwise.) As I explain in the paper, I think the result is also a theoretically significant. It has implications for the issue of the privacy of the mind, the issue of the public character of language, and for the prospects of certain varieties of the so-called "phenomenal concept strategy" for defending physicalism about consciousness (compare point (c) below).

(b) David Hume's famous case of "the missing shade of blue" is often taken to be a counter-example to many concept empiricist views. However, I argue in "Humes utelämnade nyans av blått" that it is not. It still remains to bring out the full significance of this issue and this result. Hume's case highlights, I think, a "rationalist component" of any concept empiricist view: such a view is plausible only to the extent that concept acquisition follows "paths of reason". The real significance of Hume's case is that it might *seem* to refute that rationalist supposition. However, it doesn't. I have begun to bring this out in a paper in progress called "Hume's missing shade of blue and the prospects of concept empiricism".

(c) The third result I would like to mention is of a clarifying nature. A large number of philosophers have recently advocated a "phenomenal concept strategy" for defending the physicalist view that conscious states reduce to brain states. In my paper "Phenomenal concepts" I attempt to clarify exactly what this strategy is and how it differs from other physicalist views. As I explain, the phenomenal concept strategy is a "second-level" type of view": it says that the theoretical work required to understanding the seemingly mysterious fact that consciousness is physical concerns, not the *phenomena* themselves (consciousness and the brain) but our *concepts of* these phenomena. In that sense, the theoretical work is located at a "second level". I think this is an important result, the full significance of which again remains to spell out. It clarifies how the phenomenal concept strategy differs from other physicalist views, (for example, from what I call "nonexceptionalist physicalism" and "lack-of-understanding physicalism"). It thereby clarifies that there are certain possibilities that phenomenal concept theorists cannot appeal to (but that other physicalists can appeal to) in explaining our epistemic situation vis-à-vis consciousness. In view of this the phenomenal concept strategy is, I think, ultimately not plausible. I have begun to bring this out in a paper in progress called "Should physicalists be phenomenal concept theorists?".

New research questions that have been generated in the project

I have during the project become clearer about the distinction between acquiring a concept through some rational or reasoning-like process and acquiring a concept in some other way. (Some theorists talk about this distinction in terms of "learning" a concept versus acquiring it in some other ways.) I have also become clearer about the significance of this distinction. As a part of this development, I have studied and engaged with the literature on "nativism" in general and "concept nativism" in particular. I have paid special attention to the following question: Given that - as seems to be generally accepted - one can somehow *acquire* a concept of blue from experiences of blue, might such concept acquisition be a rational or reasoning-like process? Much of the literature on "nativism" accepts or defends a negative answer to this question. However, I believe there is a lot to say in favour of a positive answer. I have begun to work this out in a paper in progress called "Can sensory concepts be learned from experience?".

Limited Concept Empiricism plays a central role in many varieties of the so-called "phenomenal concept strategy" for defending the physicalist view that conscious states are reducible to brain states. I have through the project developed a deeper interest in this strategy: what exactly defines is; how it differs from other physicalist views; and whether there are good reasons to accept it. This line of research is more fully described in section 2, point (c) above.

The project's two most important publications

I rank "On imagism about phenomenal thought" as the most important publication from the project. It is published in the renowned journal Philosophical Review. Its content briefly described in section 2, point (a) above.

It is harder to pick the second most important publication. But if forced, I would pick "Phenomenal concepts". It is published in Philosophy Compass, which is a relatively new, but widely read journal. The publication is a state-of-the-art overview, but I believe that (as many articles in that genre in philosophy) it makes a significant research contribution that provides the basis for further research (see section 2, point (c) above).

Other types of dissemination of the project's results

In addition to the published papers, results from the project have been and will be presented in the following talks:

- "Should physicalists be phenomenal concept theorists?", invited talk, conference on phenomenal concepts in Rio de Janeiro, January 24-27, 2012

- "Can one learn to think about blue from experiences of blue? Some considerations concerning nativism and 'abstractionism'", invited talk, Philosophical Society, Uppsala, October 2011.

- "Can sensory concepts be learned on the basis of experience?", Seventh European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Milan, August-September 2011.

- "Troubles for the phenomenal concept strategy", The Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association 2011 Joint Session, University of Sussex, July 2011.

- "Kan man lära sig sensoriska begrepp på basis av erfarenhet?", Filosofidagarna, Göteborg, June 2011.

- "Hume's missing shade of blue and the prospects of phenomenal concept empiricism", Toward a Science of Consciousness, Tucson, Arizona, April 2008.

- "Hume's missing shade of blue and the prospects of concept empiricism", American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Pasadena, California, March 2008.

- "Hume's missing shade of blue and the prospects of concept empiricism", Perception and content, workshop in Stockholm, September 2007.

- "Humes utelämnade nyans av blått och utsikterna för en begreppsempirism", Filosofidagarna, Umeå, June 2007.

In connection with my work on the project, I also co-organised (with Kathrin Glüer, Marie Lundstedt, and Helge Malmgren) the international workshop "Perception and Content", Stockholm, September 21-22, 2007 (http://people.su.se/~kgl/workshop/Perception%20and%20Content.htm).

Work begun in the project and still in progress

In addition to the published papers, I have in the project begun work on the three papers listed below. The papers have been described above (see sections 2 and 3). Parts of them have been presented at talks (see section 5).

- "Should physicalists be phenomenal concept theorists?"

- "Can sensory concepts be learned from experience?"

-"The missing shade of blue and the prospects of concept empiricism"