Philosophy can be subdivided into a number of sub-disciplines. One of these, with prominent historical roots, is ontology. Ontology, simply put, deals with questions concerning existence. What is there (or, perhaps better put: what kinds of entities are there?)? Three important questions for an ontologically minded philosopher are the following:

(i) What is my evidence?
(ii) What is my subject-matter?
(iii) How can I draw conclusions about (ii) from (i)?

A common view among contemporary ontologists is that (i) should be answered ‘our representation of reality’; that the answer to (ii) is ‘reality as it is, independently of how we represent it’, and; that the answer to (iii) (if at all made explicit) should be something like ‘by studying the logical form of our representations, assuming that these mirror or exactly resemble the ontological structure of reality, we can justifiably draw conclusions about (ii) from (i)’.
This latter view can, and should, be criticized and if possible replaced. This is the main-goal of the project.
The project seeks to formulate a compromise view. On this view, our representations concern reality as it is because true propositions are made true by (portions of) reality.
By studying known truths we can therefore identify the roles whatever there is must be able to play to serve as truth makers. In some, little but by no means negligible, way our ontological conclusions can therefore be seen to own empirically available justification after all.