The purpose of the project, as stated in the original project description, is threefold: 1) to contribute, from the point of view of maritime history, to the development of theories of state building, particularly as regards the expansion of the European state-system, with its idea of sovereignty and territorially defined jurisdictions, to Asia and the rest of the world after the mid-nineteenth century; 2) to question the received knowledge according to which colonial discourses of piracy mainly served to legitimize colonial expansion; and 3) to provide a much-needed historical perspective on contemporary maritime violence and thus provide a policy-relevant understanding of piracy today, in Asia and globally.

The overall purpose of the project has remained constant throughout the implementation of the project. However, the empirical studies have been altered somewhat so that the focus of the study is on the three areas that in the nineteenth century were considered the most pirate-infested in Southeast Asia: the Strait of Malacca, Indochina and the Sulu Sea. This means that all five major colonial powers in Southeast Asia – Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States – are covered in the study.

The three most important results of the project are:

First, the suppression of piracy was in all three areas under study linked to the extension of colonial territorial control and the loss, to significant but varying degrees, of sovereignty for the pre-colonial states in these areas. No straightforward link can be established, however, between, on the one hand, the degree to which indigenous states were allowed to retain a measure of sovereignty or autonomy and, on the other hand, their commitment to and cooperation in the suppression of piracy. Although it might be expected that the indigenous sovereigns who cooperated with the colonial authorities to suppress piracy would have been more likely to preserve some of their autonomy, the evidence from the three areas of investigation is mixed. Johor, Perak and Cambodia probably best correspond to the hypothesis, whereas Sulu and Vietnam, at least in part, contradict the proposition.

Second, there were significant differences with regard to how Europeans and Americans viewed the problem of piracy, in spite of the apparent ease of translating the term between European languages. The British were most concerned with piracy and maritime violence proper, mainly because of the real obstacles that piracy posed for maritime commerce and economic development. The Dutch were, to some extent, concerned with piracy for similar reasons, but in addition there was a strong need for the Dutch to demonstrate sovereignty and de facto control over the Dutch East Indies. For France, piracy and trafficking provided a major justification for intervention in Tonkin from around 1880, and the label ‘piracy’ was subsequently invoked to denote all who resisted French colonisation, even after piratical activity at sea had been effectively suppressed. For Spain the assertion of sovereignty over the Sulu Archipelago and the subordination of the Moros combined with their conversion to Christianity were the main priorities. Spain’s increasing sea power from the mid-nineteenth century allowed her to deploy extremely harsh measures designed to supress not only piracy but most peaceful maritime activities undertaken by the Moros as well. When the United States took over the Spanish colony in 1899, piracy was not initially seen as major problem, but the failure of the authorities to provide economic compensation for the opening up of the traditional pearl fishing grounds in Sulu to outsiders sparked a major outbreak of piracy in 1907. Efforts to suppress piracy were stepped up, resulting in the establishment of relative maritime security from around 1909 until the end of the American colonial period in the 1940s.

Third, naval patrols and expeditions were of central importance for the suppression of piratical activity in colonial Southeast Asia, but for the most part they worked best in combination with other measures. Gunboat diplomacy and the use of coercion in combination with negotiation was, for example, efficient in British Malaya and Sulu under American rule, mainly for the purpose of enlisting the support of indigenous rulers for suppressing piracy. Anti-piracy patrols by small steamers with shallow draughts operated by the colonial authorities were of central importance in many locations, particularly in rivers where larger naval vessels could not navigate. Depriving the pirates of their safe havens and markets for pirated goods was another important measure that was achieved, for the most part, through colonial territorial expansion. Economic development and the provision of alternative livelihoods for former or would-be pirates was another means by which piracy in the long term was made less attractive. The demise of piracy in Southeast Asia was thus for the most part achieved not only through coercion and military violence but rather through a combination of coercive and conciliatory measures. Attempts to suppress piracy through the excessive use of violence, by contrast, tended to leave a legacy of bitterness and result in drawn-out armed conflicts, such as in the Sulu Sea under Spanish rule and in Aceh after the Dutch attack in 1873. These conclusions are of policy-relevance for the suppression of piracy in the contemporary world.

Several new research directions have been generated through the project. One of the most interesting is the role of intermediaries in imperial expansion. Focusing on an American cavalry officer, Hugh Lenox Scott, who figures in the presently reported project as a district governor in Sulu in the southern Philippines, my current project, financed by Vetenskapsrådet (2017-20) investigates the role of intermediaries in the contact zones of imperial expansion. The project deals with US imperial expansion in North America, Cuba, the Philippines and Mexico from around 1875 to 1920.

The project is international in several respects: the topic, its comparative design and in terms of the dissemination and publication of the results, all of which are international. The project has also resulted in several popular presentations throughout 2016 and more presentation and shorter popular texts are to be expected in the near future.

The two most important research publications are the following:
1) The End of Piracy: Colonization and Maritime Violence in Southeast Asia, c. 1850-1920 (forthcoming monograph; manuscript of c. 120 000 words is c. 90 per cent completed, full manuscript to be delivered on 30 June 2017)

This research monograph demonstrates that piratical activity continued to occur in many parts of Southeast Asia well beyond the mid-nineteenth century, when most existing studies of piracy in the region end their period of investigation. The book points to the changes over time in how piracy was conceptualised and dealt with by each of the major colonial powers in the region, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States. It also highlights the occluded ways in which colonial and commercial interests, often unintentionally, encouraged piratical activity, as well as several now largely forgotten contemporary discussions and critical opinions pertaining to piracy and its suppression in Southeast Asia. By focusing on the interaction between colonial representations of piracy and indigenous Asian concepts and practices of maritime violence, the essentially Orientalist assumption of a sharp distinction between a “European” and an “Asian” or “Malay” understanding of piracy and maritime violence is rejected in favour of a more nuanced and entangled interpretation. (See further above for the main conclusions of the book.)

2) “Pirates and Pearls: Jikiri and the Challenge to Maritime Security and American Sovereignty in the Sulu Archipelago, 1907-09”, International Journal of Maritime History, 29:1 (2017 forthcoming, in print), 1-24.
In 1908-09 maritime commerce, fishing and traffic in the Sulu Archipelago in the Southern Philippines came almost to a stand-still due to a surge in piracy and coastal raids that challenged U.S. colonial rule in the area. In spite of the concerted efforts of the U.S. Army, the Philippine Constabulary and private bounty hunters, the pirate chief, Jikiri, was able to avoid defeat for more than one and half years, before he was eventually killed in July 1909. His decision to take to piracy was triggered by the failure of the U.S. authorities to pay compensation for the loss of the traditional claims that many families in the Sulu Archipelago had to the pearl beds of the region, as stipulated by a law on pearl fishing adopted in 1904. The law was in several respects disadvantageous to the native population of Sulu and combined with the high-handed behavior of the local officers in charge of the Sulu District from 1906 to fuel widespread discontent with colonial rule and led several of the leading headmen of Sulu covertly to sympathize with and protect Jikiri and his followers.

The article “Pirates and Pearls” will be published with full open access through an agreement (involving a substantial fee financed by the project) with SAGE Journals. At least one forthcoming article will be published open access as well, provided that the necessary financial resources are available.

The main result of the project, however, is a forthcoming monograph, for which the availability of open access options is more uncertain. A publication proposal has been submitted to a leading international university press and has received an initial positive response. The desirability of open access is raised in the proposal.

In conclusion I wish to thank Riksbankens Jubileumsfond for the generous support for my research.