The purpose of the project was to explore the origins of political philosophy in ancient Greece. In the monograph that I am currently finishing, I examine the advent of certain techniques of argumentation. Specifically, I address the phenomenon that I label ‘internal critique’, that is, the assessment of a standpoint from ‘within’, interrogating the principles and empirical premisses of a certain argument in order to see if these are actually compatible with the claim supposedly derived from them. Conventional wisdom has it that such techniques of argumentation are a Platonic invention. My thesis is, however, that these forms of argument have a fascinating prehistory which allows us to study and understand the development of argumentation, indeed that of rationality itself.

The manuscript carries the preliminary title The Origins of Political Philosophy in Ancient Greece from Homer to Sophocles. A book proposal has been sent to Cambridge University Press, and I have high hopes for it to be successful. The manuscript is in any case not quite finished; I estimate that I will finish a more definitive version during the spring. The work on the book has been much more demanding than I thought – this is in particular true of the third chapter, the work on which has been very time-consuming. At the same time, given the purpose of the project and the fact that the results in this chapter are to a great extent negative in light of the research question, it may appear to be the least interesting or relevant part of the monograph. I will return to this topic shortly.
I will go through the manuscript briefly and chapter by chapter below; finally, I will indicate some new research questions that have arisen in the project.

In the first chapter, entitled ‘Introduction: The Problem of Origins’, I discuss the origin of political philosophy. I do so first in relation to previous scholarship on the ‘origins’ of various phenomena – the beginnings of philosophy, politics, political thought, and civilisation. Second, I approach the theoretical question of the concept of ‘origin’, that is, the question how, and in what respect, something can be understoood as the origin of a phenomenon. Specifically, I outline three roads to an origin. One can, pro primo, rely on a conventional name designating a phenomenon; pro secundo, however, one can study the use of a certain word and related terms; pro tertio, and finally, one can operate with an ‘independent’ concept in the sense of an analytic definition, that is, a theoretical preconception which is independent not only of specific conventions regarding the name, but also independent of the use of a certain term in historical or contemporary sources. I have developed the notion of these three avenues in a recently published article, ‘Approaching Beginnings: The Origins of Politics and Political Thought in Ancient Greece’ (co-authored with Dimitrios Iordanoglou and published in Eranos 2018, as part of a special issue on The Origins of Political Thinking in Ancient Greece for which Iordanoglou and I have acted as guest editors), and I cautiously argue for the third path. In a critical dialogue with – but in contradistinction to – previous research, I develop the idea that political philosophy originates with internal critique, that is, attempts to refute arguments ‘from within’, with reference to the very premisses adduced to justify a standpoint. In this chapter, I then develop a typology of internal critique, mainly based on arguments in Plato. I suggest that on the basis of these theoretical considerations, we may now proceed to explore the prehistory of such techniques of argumentation before Plato, and step by step discover the techniques of normative argument.

In the second chapter, ‘Late 8th, Early 7th Centuries: Epic Silence’, I examine the oldest extant Greek literature, searching for possible traces of internal critique. The most likely case is to be found in Homer, in Iliad 16, where Hera censures Zeus for wanting to save one of his sons, Sarpedon, from death in combat. I assess the idea that Hera’s argument against Zeus can be reconstructed as an internal critique. The upshot would be that she points out that certain conclusions can be drawn on the basis of a normative principle that the godhead seems to presuppose, and that Zeus himself will be most uncomfortable with these conclusions. That argument would amount to an internal critique, but in this analysis, I draw the conclusion that such an interpretation of Hera’s words is a generous, indeed exceedingly generous, way to interpret this Homeric passage. This part of the chapter is based on my recently published article ‘Other, Wilder Origins? Political Philosophy from Plato, Sophocles and Aeschylus to Homer and Back to Anacharsis’ (Eranos, 2018). In the final part of the chapter, I make the case that no other passages in 8th and early 7th century literature can be conceived of as embodying internal critique. There are fascinating proto-philosophical arguments on a high level of abstraction in Hesiod (this is based on my recent article ‘Hesiod, Ouranos, Kronos, and the Emasculation at the Beginning of Time’, in Classical World, 2018), but no internal critique in normative contexts. We must, then, continue our search through history.

In the third chapter, ‘6th and Early 5th Centuries: Lyrical Paradox’, I examine the works from the early 6th to the early 5th century that would be the most likely candidates as sources of internal critique. Specifically, it deals with Sappho and Pindar, and discusses a few passages in the poems that exhibit a dialogical structure. I draw the conclusion that these sources are not characterised by internal critique – less so, in fact, than Homer. However, I likewise try to show that both Sappho and Pindar operate with counterintuitive images and paradoxes, to which there are sometimes a ‘logical’ solution. I cautiously make the argument that these paradoxes testify to a culture that is increasingly orientated to argumentation, contradictions and logical consistency. This is the chapter that has posed the greatest problems to me. To a great extent, this is due to the fact that it deals with sources with which I was, and am, less familiar. I have chosen not to write a separate scholarly article on the basis of this chapter, primarily because the result is negative and hence mainly meaningful within the framework of the monograph as a whole.

The fourth chapter, ‘Early and Mid 5th Century: Presocratic Vagueness, Tragic Precision’, travels from the beginning to the middle of the 5th century – 458 BC, to be exact. I begin by discussing Heraclitus DK 22 B114 as a possible instance of internal critique, but I come to the conclusion that the text and its context are too vague and imprecise to allow for such an interpretation. I then proceed to a longer analysis of Aeschylus’ Oresteia, staged in 458. I attempt to show that this is the first instance of internal critique in Greek literature. It is likewise the first passage in which a character claims (with clearly recognisable terminology) that an argument is logically inconsistent. The upshot is that we need to revise conventional wisdom with regard to Aeschylus. Moreover, we need to understand the role that he plays in the history of normative argument, for in this mid-450s drama we discover the first clear trace of internal critique. The greater part of this chapter is based on a yet unpublished paper, ‘Embryology, Logic and Murder. The Beginnings of Political Philosophy in Aischylos’ Oresteia’, which I have written with Dimitrios Iordanoglou.

The fifth chapter, ‘430s: Sophistic Refutation, Tragic Inconsistency’, takes us further into the history of internal critique by examining two sources. The dating of them is somewhat controversial, but the 430s would at least not appear unlikely. First, I show that a fragment from the Athenian Thrasymachus (DK 85 B1) seems to contain an internal critique. Curiously, Plato’s Republic portrays Thrasymachus as an inconsistent, confused and malign character who is incapable of rational argument. The context of the argument at hand is unclear, but unlike the fragment from Heraclitus discussed in the preceding chapter, the text itself is clear with regard to the structure of the argument. I then proceed to Euripides’ Cretans, a drama that is quite famous for its logical inconsistencies and argumentative aberrations. I show that we can account for them, indeed understand them as ‘logical’, in light of a normative principle that is fundamental to the Greek polity. I conclude that the Greek societies of the 430s were receptive to poetry that plays with the spectators’ expectations about logic and argumentation. This is, then, a very sophisticated internal critique that is accomplished by the spectators themselves. The greater part of this chapter is based on my article ‘Cannibalism, Vegetarianism and the Community of Sacrifice. Rediscovering Euripides’ Cretans and the Beginnings of Political Philosophy’ (Classical Philology, 2017).

The sixth chapter, ’From Comical Absurdity to Tragic Perfection’, addresses the evolution of internal critique from the 420s to ca. 409 – indeed, the completion of Preplatonic techniques of argumentation. I begin in Aristophanes’ comedy Clouds, in which we find an array of completely and ostentatiously failed arguments that allude to, yet do not come close to, the ideal of internal critique. I draw the conclusion that at this historical juncture, Athenian society was so well versed in the practice of internal critique as to understand a parody of it. I then proceed to Sophocles’ Electra, probably staged about 409, and analyse the debate about the justification of murder, revenge and retaliatory killing undertaken by Electra and her mother, Clytaemestra. In this context, I argue that Electra clearly pinpoints a logical inconsistency on the part of her mother. But not only that: this is, I argue, the first passage in extant Greek literature in which a person explicitly indicates that an argument is inconsistent with regard to a normative principle – indeed, she highlights the role played by principles in normative arguments. This is arguably the first, sit venia verbo, consummation of the form of argument that Plato would later systematise. It is likewise a highly component in the prehistory of this form of thought. This chapter is based on my article ‘Der Ursprung der politischen Philosophie. Die Evolution normativen Denkens und die Selbstzerstörung der Vergeltungsmoral in Sophokles’ Elektra‘ (Antike und Abendland, 2018).

In the final chapter, ‘Conclusions, Further Questions, Other Shores’, I summarise the results and the development of internal critique from the beginnings of Greek civilisation to the time just before Plato – an evolution that is the intellectual work of hundreds of years, in which a culture discovers principles, argumentation and rationality. Yet a few questions remain. First, we will at some point need to ask why this happened, that is, by which concrete historical circumstances this genesis of argumentation was made possible. One answer could be the (relative) freedom of expression in certain Greek cities, permitting the less powerful to question the more powerful – including, and perhaps particularly, by pointing out contradictions. Another answer could be the introduction of money, coins, which would have been conducive to abstract thought, thus rendering conceptions of equivalence more visible and palpable. Analogously, then, equivalence between actions in light of normative principles may have come to light. Second, we need to ask whether the Greeks could have learned of internal critique from other cultures and civilisations around the Mediterranean and beyond. Questions about where civilisational achievements first came about often deteriorate into destructive culture wars, but there is good reason to keep one’s historical cool when addressing these issues. This book is just the beginning of the discovery of the origins of political philosophy, and the historical and empirical preconditions of its genesis will need to be explored in future research. However, in this final chapter I suggest that testimonies of one of the Greek Seven Sages, the 6th century figure Anacharsis, seem to imply that he developed an internal critique of Greek customs and institutions (this is, again, based on the article ‘Other, Wilder Origins? Political Philosophy from Plato, Sophocles and Aeschylus to Homer and Back to Anacharsis’, Eranos 2018). Anacharsis was half Greek, half Scythian, according to some accounts bilingual, and most probably a figure of legend. But as a ‘just-so story’ of the beginnings of political philosophy it may be helpful. The results of my analyses will at any rate lead to new questions. Can political philosophy, in the sense of internal critique, have originated in other contemporaneous or earlier civilisations and cultures? Did Greek societies import it from these, or did it arise independently in Greece? The book charts out the paths of normative argument in ancient Greece. But it is the beginning of these questions, not the end – it uncovers a new field of research.

I have already suggested some new research problems that have arisen in the project – the importance of freedom of expression for the evolution of techniques of argumentation, the role of monetary systems, that of other civilisations, nearby and far away – yet which I cannot address in this monograph. But I wish to indicate another research problem that has emerged from it. My interpretations show that innovation and development with regard to techniques of argument seem to have arisen in or at least to be reflected in Athenian drama. Yet if we look at this more closely, we will see that this new technique of argumentation – internal critique – is almost invariably expressed and employed by female characters. This is fascinating. According to conventional wisdom, Greek culture – specifically, male Greeks – considered women to be non-principled, non-argumentative, non-theoretical and irrational. Yet Attic drama portrays this development of rational argument as the work of women. And this does not seem to be quite compatible with the notion of Greek thought as mere and massive misogyny. Future research will arguably need to find an explanation for this. In cooperation with Dimitrios Iordanoglou (and within the framework of his project Reason in the limelight – femininity and rationality in Classical Greek drama, funded by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation) I hope to contribute to the understanding of this intriguing phenomenon. I plan future collaborative research on this topic with scholars at the institute of classical philology at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, where I spent a remarkably stimulating and productive part of my sabbatical.