A Truthmaker Account of Social Reality
A long-standing debate in the philosophy of the social sciences revolves around the following question: what is the mode of existence of socially grounded phenomena such as corporations, social groups, money and presidents? Philosophers and social scientists have generally assumed that there are two main options: either social phenomena are reducible to lower-level phenomena (to individuals and material objects represented in certain ways) or else they are phenomena of their own kind (sui generis) existing at a higher level. However, recent work in social ontology, partly by the applicant, has revealed that neither of these two options is plausible. Building on theoretical advances made in analytic philosophy concerning so-called ‘truthmaker theory’, the current project cuts the Gordian knot by defending a third option hitherto overlooked in social ontology. In the project it will be shown in detail how a theory of truthmakers for statements about social phenomena can account for the truth of such statements, without the fatal problems afflicting the orthodox theories surfacing. The alternative, innovative explanatory model and its various applications to social ontology will be presented in a unified monograph in English building on articles in international philosophy journals by the applicant.
Final report
The objective of the project was to synthesise and develop my social ontological theories, published in international philosophy journals, into a coherent monograph. Traditionally, philosophers and social scientists have thought that there are two main options regarding the ontology and metaphysics of social phenomena: either social phenomena such as social groups, corporations and money are reducible to lower-level phenomena (to individuals and material objects represented in particular ways), or else they are phenomena of their own kind (sui generis) that exist at a higher level. I advocate a third option, according to which social phenomena are neither reducible nor sui generis. Instead, such phenomena – or rather, true statements about them – should be understood in terms of so-called ‘deflationary’ truthmakers.
Deflationary truthmakers do not stand in a strict correspondence relation to the statements they make true. An interpretation of statements about social phenomena in terms of deflationary truthmakers opens up the possibility that such statements – existential ones included – can be true without being made true by social phenomena ‘out there’ in the world. The fundamental ontology underlying the relevant truths can thus be characterised as ‘flat’ (i.e., we do not need to assume that there are different ontological levels) and as not containing downward causality (freeing us from the well-known ‘causal exclusion problem’).
The book manuscript, written in English and with the working title Social Ontology – A Deflationary Truthmakers Account, is divided into seven chapters. The book’s overall structure is as follows: The first chapter gives an introduction to social ontology and sets out some general theoretical goals for a social ontological account of social entities of kind X (where X can be social groups, laws, social properties, etc.). The theoretical goals I advocate are: compliance with Ockham's Razor (i.e., the ontology of the theory should be as parsimonious as possible), avoidance of extravagant causal relations (the theory should not entail the existence of backward and downward causation, as seen in some modern social ontological theories), and compatibility with so-called Moorean truths (claims whose truthfulness cannot be credibly questioned, such as everyday and scientific claims about the existence of social groups, laws, presidents, etc). In chapter two, I present and develop a general theory of truthmaking that allows for deflationary truthmakers, a theory that builds on earlier theorising by philosophers such as David Armstrong, Hugh Mellor and John Heil. In the subsequent three chapters, I apply the theory of truthmaking to different subsets of social phenomena (i.e., to specific values of X). In chapter three, I apply the theory to institutional properties, i.e., to properties such as being employed, being married, having a certain grade, etc. In chapter four, I apply the theory to non-institutional social properties, i.e., to properties such as being famous, being popular, being an informal leader, etc. In chapter five, I apply the theory to institutional and non-institutional social objects, such as firms, laws and informal groups. In chapter six, I discuss how causality at the social ‘level’ should be understood in light of the accounts of various social phenomena given in the previous chapters. The chapter also addresses a potential objection to my theory based on the so-called Eleatic Principle (which states that to be is to make a causal difference), a principle that goes back to Plato’s writings and is popular in modern social ontology. Finally, in chapter seven, I compare the extent to which different social ontological approaches and theories achieve the general goals I set out in chapter one. I demonstrate that a deflationary truthmakers account fulfils the objectives to the highest degree and that such a theory is consequently preferable.
Working on the book manuscript has been very rewarding, if somewhat more demanding than I expected. Among other things, the manuscript is becoming longer than I initially planned. The manuscript is therefore not finished yet, but I expect to be able to send off a complete and fully-worked-through manuscript to book publishers in early autumn 2025.
During my RJ Sabbatical, I have spent one month (October 2024) at the Department of Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. My contact person and host was Professor Frank Hindriks. Hindriks is an internationally renowned philosopher, probably best known for his work in social ontology. Hindriks has also been the editor of the international journal Journal of Social Ontology. Hindriks advocates a variant of the sui generis theory according to which social phenomena are constituted by, but not reducible to, individuals and material objects. As we defend different theories, we had many interesting discussions about each other's positions. Fittingly, during my stay Hindriks was completing his own book manuscript on social ontology, which meant that we were both interested in receiving critical but constructive input on our central theses and arguments. Hindriks organised several seminars with his many PhD students, which I attended, in which we discussed chapters from Hindriks' draft book, but also my alternative approaches. I also presented chapter three of my book manuscript at the department's official research colloquium. The discussions at these seminars were very fertile. Our discussions were so fruitful that we may apply for joint research projects in the future on social ontological issues. I have also kept in touch with some of Hindrik's doctoral students after the stay and have continued to discuss social ontological issues with them.
At my home institution in Lund, during my RJ sabbatical, I have twice presented drafts of chapters from the book at the Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy. Since my sabbatical officially ended in January 2025, I have also presented material from the book as an invited keynote speaker at the conference The Metaphysics of Social Powers: Individuals, Groups and Artefacts at the University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland (6–7 February 2025). The conference organisers have also invited me to submit my conference paper to a special issue of the international journal Metaphysics, which will have the same theme as the conference. I have also been accepted, after peer review, to present material from the book manuscript at the Social Ontology 2025 conference in Dublin, Ireland, 5–8 August 2025. In addition, I have been invited to publish a popularised version of the first chapter of the book in the yearbook of The New Society of Letters at Lund for 2026.
Finally, I would like to mention that since I applied for an RJ Sabbatical in the spring of 2023, another article (in addition to those I mentioned in the application) on which the book manuscript is based has been published in an international peer-reviewed journal. The article is entitled ‘Towards a Deflationary Truthmakers Account of Social Groups’ and is published in the journal Erkenntnis (2025, 90(1)). A shorter, popular science version of the article was published in Swedish in the autumn of 2023 in the journal Svensk filosofi, under the title ‘Vad är en grupp?’.
Deflationary truthmakers do not stand in a strict correspondence relation to the statements they make true. An interpretation of statements about social phenomena in terms of deflationary truthmakers opens up the possibility that such statements – existential ones included – can be true without being made true by social phenomena ‘out there’ in the world. The fundamental ontology underlying the relevant truths can thus be characterised as ‘flat’ (i.e., we do not need to assume that there are different ontological levels) and as not containing downward causality (freeing us from the well-known ‘causal exclusion problem’).
The book manuscript, written in English and with the working title Social Ontology – A Deflationary Truthmakers Account, is divided into seven chapters. The book’s overall structure is as follows: The first chapter gives an introduction to social ontology and sets out some general theoretical goals for a social ontological account of social entities of kind X (where X can be social groups, laws, social properties, etc.). The theoretical goals I advocate are: compliance with Ockham's Razor (i.e., the ontology of the theory should be as parsimonious as possible), avoidance of extravagant causal relations (the theory should not entail the existence of backward and downward causation, as seen in some modern social ontological theories), and compatibility with so-called Moorean truths (claims whose truthfulness cannot be credibly questioned, such as everyday and scientific claims about the existence of social groups, laws, presidents, etc). In chapter two, I present and develop a general theory of truthmaking that allows for deflationary truthmakers, a theory that builds on earlier theorising by philosophers such as David Armstrong, Hugh Mellor and John Heil. In the subsequent three chapters, I apply the theory of truthmaking to different subsets of social phenomena (i.e., to specific values of X). In chapter three, I apply the theory to institutional properties, i.e., to properties such as being employed, being married, having a certain grade, etc. In chapter four, I apply the theory to non-institutional social properties, i.e., to properties such as being famous, being popular, being an informal leader, etc. In chapter five, I apply the theory to institutional and non-institutional social objects, such as firms, laws and informal groups. In chapter six, I discuss how causality at the social ‘level’ should be understood in light of the accounts of various social phenomena given in the previous chapters. The chapter also addresses a potential objection to my theory based on the so-called Eleatic Principle (which states that to be is to make a causal difference), a principle that goes back to Plato’s writings and is popular in modern social ontology. Finally, in chapter seven, I compare the extent to which different social ontological approaches and theories achieve the general goals I set out in chapter one. I demonstrate that a deflationary truthmakers account fulfils the objectives to the highest degree and that such a theory is consequently preferable.
Working on the book manuscript has been very rewarding, if somewhat more demanding than I expected. Among other things, the manuscript is becoming longer than I initially planned. The manuscript is therefore not finished yet, but I expect to be able to send off a complete and fully-worked-through manuscript to book publishers in early autumn 2025.
During my RJ Sabbatical, I have spent one month (October 2024) at the Department of Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. My contact person and host was Professor Frank Hindriks. Hindriks is an internationally renowned philosopher, probably best known for his work in social ontology. Hindriks has also been the editor of the international journal Journal of Social Ontology. Hindriks advocates a variant of the sui generis theory according to which social phenomena are constituted by, but not reducible to, individuals and material objects. As we defend different theories, we had many interesting discussions about each other's positions. Fittingly, during my stay Hindriks was completing his own book manuscript on social ontology, which meant that we were both interested in receiving critical but constructive input on our central theses and arguments. Hindriks organised several seminars with his many PhD students, which I attended, in which we discussed chapters from Hindriks' draft book, but also my alternative approaches. I also presented chapter three of my book manuscript at the department's official research colloquium. The discussions at these seminars were very fertile. Our discussions were so fruitful that we may apply for joint research projects in the future on social ontological issues. I have also kept in touch with some of Hindrik's doctoral students after the stay and have continued to discuss social ontological issues with them.
At my home institution in Lund, during my RJ sabbatical, I have twice presented drafts of chapters from the book at the Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy. Since my sabbatical officially ended in January 2025, I have also presented material from the book as an invited keynote speaker at the conference The Metaphysics of Social Powers: Individuals, Groups and Artefacts at the University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland (6–7 February 2025). The conference organisers have also invited me to submit my conference paper to a special issue of the international journal Metaphysics, which will have the same theme as the conference. I have also been accepted, after peer review, to present material from the book manuscript at the Social Ontology 2025 conference in Dublin, Ireland, 5–8 August 2025. In addition, I have been invited to publish a popularised version of the first chapter of the book in the yearbook of The New Society of Letters at Lund for 2026.
Finally, I would like to mention that since I applied for an RJ Sabbatical in the spring of 2023, another article (in addition to those I mentioned in the application) on which the book manuscript is based has been published in an international peer-reviewed journal. The article is entitled ‘Towards a Deflationary Truthmakers Account of Social Groups’ and is published in the journal Erkenntnis (2025, 90(1)). A shorter, popular science version of the article was published in Swedish in the autumn of 2023 in the journal Svensk filosofi, under the title ‘Vad är en grupp?’.