Isak Svensson, Peace and conflict studiies, Uppsala university

2008-2013

This project deals with selection dynamics in international mediation or, in other words, why mediators go where they do. The overall question that this project has evolved around is whether different types of mediators tend to select different types of conflict situations - and thereby making them picking relatively 'hard' or 'easy' situations to mediate. Governments and some other types of mediators may have the luxury to choose, and can cherry-pick the 'easy' conflicts, leaving the 'hardest' conflicts in the lap of the UN.

Efforts to collect data on mediation efforts have been an essential part of the research project. Complementing research done on civil wars and intrastate conflicts, this project has examined the occurrence of mediation in non-armed intrastate conflicts. In the study "Peace from the Inside", we suggest that insiders - actors from within the conflict society - can complement external actors, such as the UN. Little research has focused on the internal mediators, a gap that this study tries to fill. We suggest that while insider-partial mediators bring indigenous resources to conflicts, these indigenous resources will also affect when and where these types of mediators intervene. We expect that utilizing indigenous resources will be less likely in polarized conflict settings, because insider-partial mediators are then restricted in their access to information on both sides. Furthermore, we also expect that utilizing indigenous resources will be less likely in highly escalated conflicts, because the need for information from the mediator will be less relevant when the parties are learning about each other's resolve and capabilities from their conflict behaviour.

Exploring the patterns of mediation occurrence, we find evidence of a selection effect between insider-partial and external mediators. For instance, internal mediators predominately intervene in governmental conflicts, while external mediators are more likely to be involved in territorial conflicts. Comparing the frequency of the presence of internal versus external mediators we further find that internal mediators are much more common in conflicts of lesser intensity. Taken together, this represents evidence that external mediators are selected for the most difficult conflict situations, whereas insider-partial mediators are utilized in conflict situations that are less severe. Yet, insider-partial mediators have a positive effect on the chances for negotiated settlements, even after the selection effects are taken into account.

A second important contribution of this project has been to compare mediation selection in intra- versus interstate conflicts. In the study 'Incentives for Talking' we make the first systematic comparison between mediation in inter- and intrastate conflicts. Our research question in this study is the following: to what extent is mediation offered and accepted under different conditions in interstate versus intrastate conflicts? In particular, we consider two research questions related to the variation in mediation activities: (i) we examine the variation in the supply of mediation, and (ii), we examine the demand for mediation. We argue that international mediation in intrastate and interstate conflicts are substantially different. There are circumstances when third parties are more and less likely to offer mediation. The relationship between the third party and the disputants has a stronger impact on offers to mediate in civil than interstate conflicts. Similarly, acceptance of mediation is different in interstate compared to intrastate conflicts: rebels have incentives to invite mediation in order to gain international recognition, but a similar dynamic does not apply to interstate conflicts. Governments in internal armed conflicts will therefore only turn to mediation once they anticipate that they have little chance to settle the situation by themselves. Thus, mediation will be accepted in the most 'difficult' circumstances in internal armed conflicts, whereas we would not expect to see a similar empirical pattern applying to interstate conflicts. In line with our theoretical argument, we find an empirical discrepancy between interstate and intrastate conflicts regard to demand-side (acceptance) and the supply-side (offer) of international mediation. We find that the relationship between the third party and the disputants has a stronger impact on mediation offers in civil conflicts than interstate ones. In terms of mediation acceptance, we find disputants in civil conflicts only accept mediation in the most costly conflicts. This logic, however, does not apply to the disputants in international conflicts.

A third insight has been generated by examining the mediation selection dynamics that occur between neutral and biased mediators. In the study "Who Brings Which Peace", I examine both the explanations for the occurrence of mediation as well as their effect on outcomes (in the form of stipulations of various peace arrangements), differentiating between bias and neutral mediators. There are two mediation selection reasons for why neutral mediators will be less likely to be associated with agreements of higher quality compared to biased mediators. First, they have different incentives: neutral mediators have incentives to hasten the conclusion of an agreement that puts an end to the fighting whereas biased mediators will look for stipulations that protect their side. Hence, parties in conflict would primarily request biased rather than neutral mediators in situations where they foresee that substantial concessions are about to be made. Mediators have different motivations and rationale for their involvement. Neutral mediators, that have not supported any of the sides directly, engage themselves due to their interest to end the civil war. Given their preferences, these neutral mediators suffer costs if war continues, but have no particular preferences over the outcome of the conflict. Biased mediators, on the other hand, engage themselves as third-party mediators, at least partly, because they want to ensure that the interests of their protégés are taken into account when the dispute is settled. Biased mediators have preferences over the content of the agreement, and incentives to try to get agreements that have stipulations beneficial for their side. Consequently, the belligerents will accept biased mediators either because they have incentives to protect their interests or because they hold particular possibilities to credibly communicate information the other side. Thus, in situations where agreements are about to be formed that imply larger substantial concessions from the parties, governments or rebels have incentives to seek mediators that are either government-biased or rebel-biased, respectively, rather than neutral. Empirically examining the patterns of mediated outcome from bias and neutral mediators yields support to this argument.

New research questions and approaches that came up during the project include the inclusion of case studies to complement the more limited quantitative approach outlined in the research proposal. In fact, one of the comments from the RJ reviewer to my original application pointed out the quantitative efforts should preferably be combined with case studies. At the beginning of the research project, I was invited to engage in a case study analysis of the Swedish mediator Jan Eliasson. I found this a very good opportunity to explore mediation selection dynamics from the perspective of one mediator, and collect more qualitative data that could complement the statistical analysis. A large part of this book (The Go-Between: Jan Eliasson and the Styles of Mediation) on Eliasson's mediation experiences dealt with the dynamics of mediation selection questions,

Another new avenue for research has been the decision to complement the large N cross-country analysis and the case studies with a randomized field experiment. This one was conducted in Ethiopia, and although it was only a minor part of this program, I think it contributed to the examination of selection dynamics. Randomization is the most powerful methodology available that eliminates the problem of selection problems. Together with local partners in Ethiopia, and a colleague at the University of Otago (Dr Karen Brounéus), I have conducted this study where we randomly select participants into a conflict resolution process, "Sustained Dialogue", from two pools of interested participants. "Sustained Dialogue" is a sort of dialogue or "micro-mediation" process, and this level of analysis is required for examining the causal pathways in more detail.

The research project has had an ambition of public outreach with the research. Although the workshop at the UN Mediation Unit could not be implemented as originally envisioned in the application, the research project's contributed to two other important international research - policy dialogue conferences, one in Uppsala and one in Washington (USIP). Moreover, I have summarized my work on mediation, some of which has been funded as part of this project, in an article that aims for a more general, non-specialized audience, 'The Role of Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications'.

In terms of productivity, this project has been a great success. Two research monographs have been published and a book contract has been signed for a third book. Five research articles have been published (or accepted for publication) in international peer-reviewed journals, including some prestigious ones, as well as one review article where I summarize policy implications of my own research on bias in mediation. Two book chapters (one of which is in Swedish) have also been published. I have also presented my work on several conferences and workshops as well as published reports aimed for a more general, non-academic audience.

Publications report

RESEARCH MONOGRAPHS
Isak Svensson: Ending Holy Wars: Religion and Conflict Resolution, University of Queensland Press, 2012, ISBN: 978 0 7022 4956 3

Isak Svensson & Peter Wallensteen, The Go-Between: Jan Eliasson and the Styles of Mediation, 2010, United Institute of Peace Press (USIP), Washington D.C.; ISBN: 978-1-60127-062-7

RESEARCH ARTICLES IN INTERNATIONAL ACADEMIC JOURNALS (peer-reviewed)
Isak Svensson & Mathilda Lindgren, “Peace from the Inside: Exploring the Role of the Insider Partial Mediators”, International Interactions, accepted dec 2012

Isak Svensson: “Crowded with Conciliators: Exploring Multiparty Mediation in Civil Wars”, Peace & Policy, no 16, 2011

Niall O Dochartaigh & Isak Svensson, “The Exit Option: Mediation and the Termination of Negotiations in the Northern Ireland Conflict”, International Journal of Conflict Management, forthcoming: vol. 24, no 1, 2013

Molly Melin & Isak Svensson, “Incentives for Talking: Acceptance of Mediation in International and Civil Wars”, International Interactions, 35(3), 2009

Isak Svensson, “Who Brings Which Peace: Biased versus Neutral Mediation and Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53:3, p. 446 – 469, 2009

REVIEW ARTICLES IN INTERNATIONAL ACADEMIC JOURNALS (peer-reviewed)
Isak Svensson, The Role of Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications, Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs (Special issue on policy implications of conflict prevention and mediation research), forthcoming 2013

BOOK CHAPTERS
Isak Svensson, “Partial Peacemakers: Explaining Mediation Success in African Armed Conflicts”, in Thomas Ohlson (ed): From Intra-State War to Durable Peace: Conflict and its Resolution in Africa after the Cold War, Dordrecht: Republic of Letters Publishing, 2011

Isak Svensson: Medling och förhandling [Mediation and negotiation, in Swedish], in Kristine Höglund & Karin Aggestam (eds): Lärobok i freds- och konfliktstudier, Lund: Studentlitteratur, (2012)

ON-GOING WORK
Isak Svensson & Karen Brounéus, “Dialogue and Inter-Ethnic Trust: A Randomized Field Experiment in Ethiopia”, Journal of Peace Research, status: Revise & resubmit

Isak Svensson: Taking Side in the Middle: Why Biased Mediators Bring Peace Institutions in Civil Wars, book contract signed with Routledge

OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Isak Svensson, The Nagorno Karabakh conflict: Lessons from the mediation efforts; Initiative for Peacbuilding / The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), Brussels, 2009 

Evan A. Hoffman and Isak Svensson: Pinning Down Peace: Towards a Multi-Dimensional, Clustered Measure of Mediation Success. Published by The Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation (CIIAN) Ottawa, Canada and The National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (NCPACS) Dunedin, New Zealand, 2012

Book note on Kyle Beardsley: The Mediation Dilemma, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011, Journal of Peace Research, 2012
Book note on Sisk, Timothy D, 2009. International Mediation in Civil Wars: Bargaining with Bullets. London: Routledge. Journal of Peace Research 47(2) 251–257

Conference papers (selected)
“International mediation: insights and findings”, paper presented at the international conference “Meeting the New Challenges to International Mediation”, arranged by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research (DPCR), Uppsala University, Uppsala, June 14-16, 2010

“Incentives for talking: Acceptance of Mediation in International and Civil Wars”, paper presented at the for Annual Convention for the International Studies Association, New York, February 2009; co-author: Molly Melin

“Peace from the Inside: Exploring the Role of the Insider-Partial Mediators”, paper presented at the Annual Convention for the International Studies Association, New York, February 2009; co-author: Mathilda Lindgren